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Abstract
What shapes attitudes towards procedural rules that constrain executive power? This letter
argues that procedural values are contextual: A function of who is in power. Supporters
of those in power prefer fewer procedural constraints, while opposition supporters prefer
greater. I provide a unique test using data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Elec-
tion Survey. Respondents were asked, in both pre- and post-election waves, if they thought
it should be “easier or harder for the President to keep documents secret from the public.”
The panel design makes it possible to track individual changes following the shift in political
context. I find evidence of partisan ‘flip’ in attitudes following the election, with Republi-
cans becoming less likely – and Democrats more likely – to prefer additional constraints
on presidential secrecy. I also find this partisan ‘flip’ present only among higher political
knowledge respondents.
Introduction
What shapes individuals’ attitudes towards procedural rules? Procedural rules concern not
the outcomes of government decisionmaking but rather the processes by which decisions are
made, and include constraints on executive power, bipartisanship, impartiality, and transparency.
Public attitudes towards such rules are crucial elements of democratic institutions, particularly
when constraints depend not purely on formal rules, but also on informal norms (Schmitter and
Karl 1991, Christenson and Kriner 2017, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
This letter argues that such procedural values are fundamentally contextual: A function of
which party is in power. Procedural rules have differential consequences for policial parties –
they create winners and losers. Fewer constraints on executive authority benefit the party that
controls the executive, while greater constraints benefit those that do not. Partisanship in turn
leads supporters of the party in power to prefer fewer procedural constraints, and opposition sup-
porters to prefer greater constraints. This approach further predicts that when the party in power
switches, partisans will also shift their procedural values to match the new political context.
This article offers a unique test of this approach, in the case of American attitudes towards
presidential secrecy before and after the November 2016 election, using data from the Cooper-
ative Congressional Election Survey. Respondents were asked, in both pre- and post-election
waves, if they thought it should be “easier or harder for the President to keep documents secret
from the public.” The panel nature of the study enables a stronger test than in previous work,
making it possible to track the responses of the same individuals following a real-world shift in
political context.
I find evidence of a partisan “flip” in attitudes following the election, with Republicans be-
coming less likely – and Democrats more likely – to prefer additional constraints on presiden-
tial secrecy. Assessing the role of political knowledge, I find the partisan “flip” in attitudes
present only among higher-knowledge respondents. In fact, all lower political knowledge re-
spondents shift towards preferring less presidential secrecy, across Republicans, Independents,
and Democrats.
To be clear, it was not anticipated that this approach would provide so a powerful a test of
the role of political context. I originally planned to leverage evidence from a shift between two
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conditions: An expected – though uncertain – Clinton victory; and a realized Clinton victory.
The unexpected (see e.g. CNN 2016) Trump victory yielded, instead, evidence from a much
starker shift: Between an expected Clinton victory and a realized Trump victory.
By demonstrating the political logic of procedural attitudes in the case of presidential secrecy,
this study suggests both optimistic and pessimistic implications for scholarship on procedural
norms. Optimistically, these results suggest that democratic systems can effectively generate
their own ever-shifting constituencies for procedural values. More pessimistically, the finding
that partisan effects are conditional on political knowledge suggests that the most powerful po-
tential constituency for procedural constraints may be those who are normally least politically
engaged. And conversely, that the least consistent support for procedural constraints comes
those who are most politically sophisticated, and thus most used to interpreting the political
world through partisan information processing.
Partisan Bias and Procedural Values
Research in American politics has long found public attitudes shaped by partisan considera-
tions (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960, Zaller 1992, Bartels 2002), and recent work has also generally
found that such partisan biases are present to a greater degree among those with greater, rather
than lower, political knowledge (Taber and Lodge 2006). Gaines et al. (2007, 957) suggest this
is because they “more effectively used interpretations to buttress their existing partisan views,”
while Jerit and Barabas (2012, 672) attribute it to both “the supply of information as well as
psychological processes.” However, some have found the opposite. For example, Anduiza et al.
(2013, 1664) find that partisan bias in corruption evaluations in Spain “disappears when political
awareness is high.”
This study extends this focus beyond attitudes towards factual evaluations and high-profile
issues clearly linked to partisan positions, to procedural rules pertaining to the powers of and
constraints on the executive. Secrecy is not an issue on which partisanship or ideology offers a
clear cue that is consistent across time.
Instead, I argue that attitudes towards secrecy and transparency are crucially shaped by their
context-dependent political consequences. Any shift that creates greater transparency or con-
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straints on secrecy will have differential consequences across the political landscape: Greater
costs for individuals and groups currently in power, and greater benefits for those in opposition.
Limitations on secrecy confront those in power with new risks of unwanted disclosures, adverse
media attention, and new constraints on policymaking discretion (Berliner 2014, Berliner et al.
Forthcoming). For these reasons, as well as for reasons of perceived policy efficacy and organi-
zational culture, executives and their administrations generally prefer secrecy and resist attempts
to reduce or constrain it (Roberts 2006, Pasquier and Villeneuve 2007).
Individuals with partisan attachments – whether psychological, social, or ideological – in
turn interpret these consequences through the lens of their partisanship. Procedural rules can
either benefit or threaten (Mason 2016) the groups with which partisans identify, depending on
which group is in power and thus disproportionately affected.
However, empirical evidence on the role of partisanship in procedural attitudes has been
mixed. Reeves and Rogowski (2015, 2016) do find partisan differences in support for presi-
dential powers, including executive privilege. Christenson and Kriner (2017) find differences in
partisan support for presidential unilateral action depending on whether survey prompts refer-
enced President Bush or President Obama. Others find evidence of partisan effects on procedural
values in other contexts (e.g. Goren 2005, Anduiza et al. 2013, Park and Smith 2016, Ahlquist
et al. 2018). Yet several other studies find no evidence of partisan effects (e.g. Gibson 2007,
Doherty and Wolak 2012, Reeves and Rogowski 2018), even in support for presidential powers
in a survey experiment varying the hypothetical identity of the president (Reeves et al. 2017).
One potential explanation for these mixed findings is the difficulty in studying real-world
changes of the party in power (and thus which group benefits or is threatened). Existing evidence
comes overwhelmingly from either associations in general population surveys at a given point
in time, or from the effects of researcher-manipulated vignette treatments in survey experiments.
Neither of these, however, can recreate the conditions necessary to fully understand the true
effect of interest: What happens to attitudes when national-level political control itself changes.
Indeed, Christenson and Kriner (2017, p.341) note that “comparing across presidents... is no
easy task.” No existing studies on procedural values incorporate such real-world changes in
political context, with important exceptions of Smith and Park (2013) who survey a panel of
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respondents before and after intensification of Senate health care debate in 2009-10, and Bartels
and Kramon’s (2020) study of attitudes towards judicial power in Ghana, using repeated cross-
sections across presidential elections.
I thus build on this literature by examining changes in procedural attitudes following a major
shift in politicial context, similar to Gerber and Huber’s (2010) study of economic evaluations,
and thus avoiding the “captive audience assumption” (Druckman et al. 2012) of studies using
survey-based information treatments.
Previous research on attitudes towards secrecy and transparency has not focused attention
on contextual factors that change depending on political configurations. Rather, such studies
generally focus on individual and institutional factors that remain largely constant over time.
Partisanship and ideology have often emerged as important findings. For example, Piotrowski
and Van Ryzin (2007) find several factors associated with citizen demand for government trans-
parency, including political ideology – although in different directions for different dimensions
of transparency. Cuillier (2008) finds some evidence that political conservatism is associated
with less support for press access to government records. Cuillier and Pinkleton (2011, 227)
focus on “psychographic factors,” including liberalism, in explaining support for government
transparency. However, none of these studies are able to disentangle the partisanship of individ-
ual respondents from broader political configurations, meaning that findings relating ideology or
partisanship with procedural values could be a function of time-bound political context.
In sum, past research offers conflicting expectations. Previous studies of attitudes towards
transparency and secrecy suggest leading roles for individual characteristics and constant (rather
than context-specific) ideological patterns. Some studies of procedural attitudes have identi-
fied partisan biases, yet others have found none. And while many scholars of public opinion
have found that political knowledge accentuates, rather than dampens, partisan biases, few have
extended this to attitudes towards procedural values, and one study of attitudes towards respon-
sibility for corruption even found the reverse.
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Data and Model
The data in this study comes from Arizona State University Team Module (Hoekstra 2019)
of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, an online panel survey conducted by
YouGov before and after the election (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2016). The pre-election
surveys for this module were in the field from September 28, 2016 to November 3, 2016, and
the post-election surveys were in the field from November 9, 2016 to December 12, 2016. This
study’s questions were asked in a module of 1,000 respondents. Of these, 789 took the post-
election survey and responded to the outcome question in both rounds.
To measure support for constraints on presidential secrecy, respondents were presented with
the following prompt, and a visual scale running from “Much harder” to “Much easier”:
“Do you think it should be easier or harder for the President to keep documents secret from
the public? Please choose a point along the scale.”
The direction of this scale has been flipped in this analysis, for ease of interpretation, such that
a value of 0 represents “much easier” and 100 “much harder.” Higher values of this scale reflect
greater demand for constraints on secrecy and thus greater transparency. Respondents answered
this question twice, once in the pre-election wave and once in the post-election wave.
Several points are worthy of note. First, the question uses simple language to explicitly
assess views toward constraints on presidential power – whether secrecy should be more or less
constrained. Second, the wording of this question sidesteps potential knowledge differences of
the precise status quo policy on presidential secrecy, instead capturing only preferred changes.
This approach is similar to studies of thermostatic public opinion, capturing responses “anchored
to the actual (or perceived) level of current spending, the policy status quo” (Wlezien 1995, 984).
Third, the timing of the post-election wave is also important, in terms of what had not yet
taken place. Trump had not yet taken office and so was not yet actually President. There were not
yet any top-down political party cues regarding constraints on secrecy, that might offer heuristics
how to respond. Finally, elite opinion among Republicans had not yet consolidated around
support for the soon-to-be President, with many Republican public figures still expressing high-
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profile concerns. All of these factors would lead a priori expectations to tend against a strong
partisan shift in attitudes towards constraints on presidential secrecy.
While the average response shifted only slightly (see Appendix) from the first to the second
wave, this masks substantial heterogeneity as different individuals shifted in different directions.
The within-individual correlation between pre-election and post-election responses is only 0.29.
A full 64 percent of respondents shifted by ten or more points in either direction, and 32.6 percent
crossed the midpoint in one direction or the other – either from below 50 to above, or vice versa.
I measure the outcome variable in three ways: First, a dichotomous indicator of whether
respondents shifted towards preferring greater constraints on secrecy. Second, a more restrictive
indicator for only those respondents shifting ten or more points in that direction. Finally, I
use a continuous measure of the raw within-individual changes. Given the complexity of the
outcome variable, consistency across these approaches ensures the results are not dependent
on one measure. By only modelling within-individual changes, these approaches automatically
difference out any individual-specific omitted variables that might be correlated with either initial
or post-election attitudes in levels. However, control variables are also included in some models,
to ensure that the effect of partisanship on within-individual changes is not confounded by some
other factor.
I measure partisanship by aggregating respondents’ pre-election seven-point party identifi-
cation into Republicans, Independents, and Democrats, coding ‘leaners’ as partisans. Primary
models omit Independents in order to directly compare Republicans to Democrats, although this
choice is varied in robustness checks along with alternate measures of partisanship, or vote inten-
tion. I measure political knowledge using the number of eight items respondents could correctly
answer, pertaining to party control of the House, Senate, state legislative houses, their governor,
Senators, and Representative. Some models include controls for gender, age, race (dummy vari-
able for white), military family (if respondent or any family member currently or ever served),
education (0 to 5 scale), and income (0 to 1 scale with separate dummy for non-response).
Both logistic and linear regressions are estimated using the survey package in R, employ
module survey weights, and cluster standard errors by state.1
1The single respondent from Vermont was dropped to enable clustering by state.
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Results
Figure 1 shows the average within-person change in support for constraints on presidential
secrecy (with survey weights), separately by partisanship, giving an initial indication of large
partisan effects. The first panel shows that Democrats shifted to prefer greater constraints on
presidential secrecy, Republicans to prefer fewer, and Independents shifted more similarly to
Democrats. The second and third panels repeat this in sub-samples split at the mean political
knowledge. Even this illustration of the raw responses makes the main findings starkly clear:
The partisan “flip” takes place only among high political knowledge individuals. I next proceed
to model these shifts in order to confirm that they are statistically meaningful and not an artifact
of some other factor.
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Figure 1: Average within-person changes in support for constraints on presidential secrecy (100-point scale),
moving from the pre-election survey wave to the post-election survey wave, for all individual, individuals below
mean political knowledge, and above. Dotted lines show 90% confidence intervals.
Results (Table 1) confirm a large and statistically significant ‘partisan flip’ in attitudes. Re-
publicans are less likely (and Democrats more likely) to shift attitudes in the direction of pre-
ferring greater constraints on presidential secrecy. These findings hold with or without control
8
variables, and using either the less or more restrictive outcome indicator. Modeling the raw
change in response shows that Republicans shift on average 9.28 points more than Democrats in
the direction of preferring fewer constraints on secrecy after the election.
Results including interaction terms between partisanship and political knowledge find sig-
nificant interactive effects, with larger partisan effects among those with greater political knowl-
edge. Figure A2 in the Appendix shows marginal effects plots of these results, demonstrating
that the differences in individual changes in attitudes across Republicans and Democrats are sta-
tistically insignificant at low levels of knowledge, but significant and very substantial at high
levels. Among the most politically knowledgeable, the probability of a shift in attitudes towards
greater constraints on secrecy is 0.35 lower for Republicans than for Democrats; while the av-
erage within-individual shift in raw score is 19.4 further in a negative direction for Republicans
than for Democrats. This finding suggests that such individuals more readily link questions such
as these to their anticipated political consequences – either because they are more aware of such
consequences, or care more about them.
Additional results in the Appendix demonstrate the main findings’ robustness. The main
results of interest are highly similar across models employing alternate measures in place of par-
tisanship, additional control variables, and inclusion of independents in the sample. No other
interaction term with partisanship is significant, aside from an alternate proxy for political so-
phistication. Finally, as identification depends on the assumption that no other event aside from
the shift in presidential partisan context affected partisan attitudes over this period, I employ a
placebo test measuring changing attitudes towards secrecy by state governors, rather than the
President. Partisanship is insignificant in explaining changing attitudes towards gubernatorial
secrecy, emphasizing the prime role played by the change in national party-of-the-president.
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Conclusion
Recent political developments have renewed concerns over the sources and survival of both
formal and informal democratic norms (e.g. Nyhan 2017, Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Whereas
formal rules may be inscribed in constitutions and laws, informal norms depend also on the
values of both elites and, potentially, mass publics. This makes public attitudes towards pro-
cedural rules a highly relevant topic for contemporary study. Many democratic norms pertain
to procedural values, such as values over participation, deliberation, checks and balances, and
bipartisanship. Transparency and secrecy, the focus of this study, are similar: pertaining to deci-
sionmaking processes rather than outcomes.
A long tradition of research sees potential for the logic of partisan competition itself to lead
to such procedural rules, including constraints in the House of Representatives (Binder 1996),
new accontability and oversight institutions (Grzymala-Busse 2006), and the adoption of trans-
parency laws (Berliner and Erlich 2015, Michener 2015). All these procedural values create
differential consequences across political configurations: They are constraining and costly for
those in power, and offer protection and potential benefits for those out of power. Transparency
not only constrains but also creates new risks of adverse media attention for those in power; risks
which greater secrecy can ameliorate.
It is precisely these consequences that have been used to argue that democratic norms can
originate in, and draw sustenance from, the ‘enlightened self-interest’ of partisan actors who
recognize the wisdom in trading short-term and particularistic constraints for long-term and
broadly-shared benefits. Yet there is no guarantee that this will always be the case. The very
political logic suggests that the strongest constituency for upholding such norms will always lie
precisely where actual political power to do so is weakest.
This study finds this driving role of political context extending beyond political elites them-
selves, to the public at large. The power of partisanship (Bartels 2002, Huddy et al. 2015) is
such that individuals shift their attitudes towards constraints on presidential secrecy depending
on their political alignment with the current President and party in power. However, these shifts
are strongest among more politically sophisticated respondents. This finding suggests stark lim-
its to how ‘enlightened self-interest’ might yield partisan restraint among mass publics.
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Of course, the findings here may not generalize to a more “ordinary” political transition, par-
ticularly with a more conventional Republican candidate. While this study cannot evaluate this
possibility with certainty, there are also reasons to expect political effects to be even stronger, not
weaker, in more ordinary circumstances where partisans are more internally unified. Similarly,
as this study’s primary outcome variable of interest pertains only to secrecy and transparency,
not to other procedural values, it remains a possibility that these results may not generalize fur-
ther. However, this setting also offers a particularly hard test of the partisan bias hypothesis, as
secrecy is a more obscure issue than other, more high-profile values that have received greater
scholarly attention. Additionally, the question wording in this study asks respondents not about
support for the exercise of presidential power itself, but rather for constraints on it. Future re-
search should further extend investigation of attitudes towards different procedural rules across
multiple settings.
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Supplementary Material
Data and replication files are available in Harvard Dataverse at:
<https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WJPSJ2> and online appendices are available at: TBA.
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Figure A1: Three histograms showing the distribution of support for constraints on presidential secrecy, in the
pre-election and post-election survey waves, and of individual changes. A positive change reflects a shift towards
supporting greater constraints on secrecy. All three based on the 789 respondents that took both survey waves and
answered both questions. Dashed line indicates the mean value.
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Figure A2: Color version of main manuscript Figure 1. Average within-person changes in support for constraints on
presidential secrecy (100-point scale), moving from the pre-election survey wave to the post-election survey wave, for
all individual, individuals below mean political knowledge, and above. Dotted lines show 90% confidence intervals.
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Figure A3: Marginal effects of Republican partisan identification at varying levels of political knowledge, based on
simulations from results of Models 3 and 9 in Table 1 in the main paper. Dashed lines indicate 95 percent confidence
interval.
3
Robustness Checks
Table A3 presents models replacing the measure of partisan identification with an indicator for
Trump vote, either reported vote intention in pre-election survey, or reported vote choice in post-
election survey. Results are highly similar both for the main models and the interaction terms
with political knowledge.
Table A4 retains Independents in the sample (which were omitted from the sample in the main
results), comparing either Republicans to the set of Democrats and Independents, or Democrats
to the set of Republicans and Independents. Results are highly similar to the main results.
Table A5 includes additional control variables to test for alternative explanations of the results.
In case the results were an artifact of varying initial attitudes towards transparency across partisan
groupos, Models 1-3 control for an index of principled support for transparency. This is an additive
index of six questions, asked prior to the outcome variable question. These questions assess both
support for transparency and tradeoffs between transparency and competing values like secrecy
and national security. Respondents chose from a 5-point Likert scale for each of the following
statements. Responses to the latter three were subsequently flipped so that higher values for each
represents greater value for a principle of transparency.
• Citizens have a right to get the information they want from the government.
• More information about what the government does would help me make better decisions
about how to vote.
• More information about what the government does would help fight corruption.
• It is important for the government to keep some information secret to protect national security.
• It is important for the government to keep some information secret to protect the privacy of
other citizens.
• Answering citizens’ requests for information is a waste of the government’s time and resources.
The transparency index has no effect on the outcome variable and does not substantively change
the main results.
4
Another alternate explanation for this paper’s main findings might be simple reversion to the
mean, as individuals with extreme positions on the scale of attitudes towards presidential secrecy
simply tend to adopt less extreme positions at a later point in time. To address this possibility,
I include a robustness check controlling for the initial response in the pre-election survey wave
(Models 4-6 in Table A4). However, as these initial responses already capture a substantial element
of partisanship, this is a difficult test. Although the effects are more uncertain and smaller in
magnitude, all remain in the expected direction and some are statistically significant.
Although it is difficult to envision, one might argue that the changes in attitudes towards
Presidential secrecy might be due to some other change that took place in between survey waves,
unrelated to the Presidential election itself. To address this possibility, I can control for responses
to an additional question that posed an identical prompt about keeping documents secret, but
pertaining to the governor of the respondent’s state rather than to the President. By controlling
for changes in this response (Models 7-9 in Table A5), I capture any broader shifts in attitudes
towards secrecy - distinct from the presidency - that may have taken place in the intervening period.
(The two change variables are correlated at only 0.53.) The main results of interest remain very
similar, even though the coefficient on Governor Secrecy Change is also large and significant.
Table A6 shows alternative interaction terms between partisanship and other variables. The
first of these (Model 1) is an alternative measurement approach to political knowledge, using an
indicator of high reported interest in following the news, in place of the index of factual items
correctly answered. The results are highly similar. The remaining models in Table A6 assess
a potential concern that some other factor might be more relevant than political knowledge in
explaining variation in the ‘partisan flip’ in attitudes. However, no other interaction terms are
identified as statistically significant, confirming the importance of political knowledge.
Table A7 employs an alternate measure of partisanship, using the seven-point partisan identifi-
cation scale itself in place of an indicator for Republicans (or Democrats, as in Table A4). Results
remain highly similar. Models 7 and 8 in this table estimate specific categorical effects for each
level of the seven-point scale. This reveals surprisingly large effects (in the hypothesized directions)
for weak partisans (Lean Republican and Lean Democrat), yet smaller effects for strong partisans.
Finally, Table A8 shows a placebo test using the change in attitudes towards gubernatorial
5
secrecy as an alternative outcome variable. This further helps to assess an alternative explanation
that some other change over the intervening period is responsible for the main results. Models
1-3 include all respondents, while Models 4-6 exclude respondents form the twelve states with
gubernatorial elections in 2016. In all cases, partisanship plays no significant role in explaining
variation in attitudes towards gubernatorial secrecy, emphasizing the prime role played by the
change in national party-of-the-president.
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